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ABSTRACT 
 
 
It has been estimated that over 150 real estate opportunity fund sponsors have emerged since the 
advent of the so called “Real Estate Opportunity Fund” industry.  The industry, now more than 
15 years old, has experienced significant growth since its inception.  As the real estate private 
equity industry continues to mature and becomes more competitive, fund sponsors must ensure 
that they are best in class in all facets of their business, and the structuring of their investment 
vehicle is a perfect place to start. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the most important fund level structuring issues facing 
real estate opportunity fund sponsors when raising a new fund.  It begins by reviewing the 
history of the real estate private equity industry, specifically real estate opportunity funds.  The 
study follows with a recounting of the industry’s standard legal, financial, and tax structures for 
these funds.  Finally, utilizing the results of a comprehensive industry survey and interview 
process, the paper gives an update of the current industry practices. 
 
After a thorough study, it is clear that a fund’s structure will largely be determined by the 
investor makeup and the respective fund strategy.  This fact implies that there can truly be no 
”one-size-fits-all” best practice.  While no particular new best practices were uncovered, the 
results were very interesting, and they provide general guidelines for fund sponsors to follow 
given a variety of different circumstances.  
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Titles: Assistant Professor of Real Estate and Professor of Real Estate Finance 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
Real estate opportunity funds have been an increasingly powerful force in U.S. real estate 
since their climb to widespread popularity during the real estate recession of the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  The current proliferation of real estate opportunity fund sponsors 
is making for an extremely competitive environment.  Increasingly similar structures and 
strategies seen in today’s funds signal that the industry is moving towards 
standardization.  Now, more than ever, as real estate opportunity funds become more 
homogeneous, their sponsors must ensure that they are best in class in all facets of their 
business in order to compete successfully.  This paper explores the origin and the history 
of the opportunity fund industry in order to provide context for the current state of the 
industry.  A specific emphasis is placed on the current structuring of the high-yield, 
commingled real estate investment vehicle often referred to as an opportunity fund, 
which can be defined as a real estate private equity fund that seeks opportunistic 
compounded returns of 18% (or higher) per year (Ernst & Young, 2005).  To simplify the 
material for pedagogical purposes, the focus of this paper is limited to U.S.-based 
opportunity funds.   
 
The motivation for this thesis is to uncover the most important structuring issues facing 
both the rookie and veteran fund sponsors when launching a new fund and to identify the 
current industry best practices.  An integral part of identifying these issues is to 
understand the investors’ perspective.  Generally, a fund’s structure is dictated by the 
needs and concerns of the investors, including those of the general partner.  Gaining the 
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perspective of the various capital providers offers great insight into what has historically 
actuated many of the structures existing today.   
 
The thesis should benefit all fund sponsors who are currently raising funds in the United 
States, as well as the nascent real estate participants who may decide to sponsor an 
opportunity fund in the future.  Most of the veteran fund sponsors have raised funds 
before and thus are likely to have already selected the structure that works best for them, 
as is probably the case for the large investment banks and the established private 
investment companies.  However, these fund sponsors can benefit from the discussion of 
the variety of structures now utilized to accommodate certain classes of investor as well 
as any best practices that are analyzed below.  For the new fund sponsors who may not 
have an ideal structure in mind, this thesis can serve as a guide to the basics and give the 
fund sponsors an idea of the marketplace standards, given their respective investor 
composition.  In either case, a current and thorough analysis of the important structuring 
issues related to raising a new real estate opportunity fund in this maturing, non-
regulated, and highly proprietary industry will benefit industry participants and serve as a 
benchmark for all fund sponsors. 
 
The following section describes the research methodology utilized for this paper.  
Chapter II gives the history and origin of the current real estate private equity industry, 
specifically real estate opportunity funds.  Chapter II also provides the reader with a 
sense of the enormity of the present-day industry and the unprecedented growth that it is 
currently experiencing.  Chapter III outlines the typical opportunity fund legal structure 
and the various reasons behind its current form.  Chapter IV walks through the common 
                                                                           7
financial structure seen within the industry today, and Chapter V explores several key tax 
issues that directly affect both the legal structure and the financial terms described in 
Chapters III and IV of the paper.  The survey and interview results are detailed in Chapter 
VI.  The results and findings of this paper are summed up in the conclusion, Chapter VII. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology for this thesis is predominantly qualitative.  The research 
material is derived from U.S. government documents, industry-related books, journals, 
and articles, as well as fund-level organizational charts, survey results, and interview 
results gathered from the industry participants. 
 
I utilized related literature, as outlined above, to provide the reader with an industry 
overview and other necessary background information.  Additionally, I interviewed 
Sanford (“Sandy”) Presant, Co-Chairman of the National Real Estate Fund Practice at 
DLA Piper Rudnick Gary Cary US, LLP (“DLA”).  Prior to his tenure at DLA, Presant 
was the National Co-Director of Real Estate Private Equity Fund Services at Ernst & 
Young, LLP.  An expert in this space, he is my primary resource for the legal and tax 
related discussions.   
 
Lastly, I distributed surveys to twenty-one fund sponsors and conducted interviews with 
representatives from two large pension funds and two prominent university endowment 
funds.1  The survey and interview processes, respectively, served to uncover any existing 
best practices currently used by fund sponsors and to identify the most significant 
concerns of the major investors.  The fund sponsors in the survey included some of the 
                                                 
1 All results obtained during the survey and interview processes are confidential and presented so as to 
protect the anonymity of the participants.  
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original players in the opportunity fund arena (both investment bank and private 
investment company sponsors) and several relatively new participants to the fund sponsor 
world. 
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CHAPTER II: INDUSTRY & FUND OVERVIEW 
COMMINGLED PRIVATE EQUITY REAL ESTATE FUNDS 
As real estate has become more widely accepted as an investable asset class, the 
institutional asset management community has gradually increased its allocation to real 
estate.  Over the last six years the lackluster performance of the more traditional asset 
classes, such as equities and fixed income products, as well as real estate’s negative 
correlation to the broader investment market has also contributed to the unprecedented 
investment in the public and private real estate markets.  Currently, high-yield private 
equity real estate funds are a very popular avenue of investment for the sophisticated 
investor.  The new-found favor of the real estate asset class combined with the favorable 
historical track record of these private equity real estate investment vehicles has sparked 
significant investor demand, which is clearly evidenced by the staggering number and 
sheer size of the current funds being raised. 
 
Private equity investment funds in the non-real estate context are not a new concept.  In 
fact, these funds have been around since the late 1970s (Linneman and Ross, 2002).  The 
idea was to create investment vehicles with the ability to pool equity in order to invest in 
undervalued or distressed companies and apply large amounts of leverage to further 
enhance returns.  These funds are commonly referred to as leveraged buyout (“LBO”) 
funds, and they typify the landscape of traditional private equity investment funds.  
 
An LBO fund structure was the model emulated by Sam Zell in partnership with Merrill 
Lynch to take advantage of the distressed asset market resulting from the savings and 
loan (“S&L”) crisis of the late 1980s (Linneman and Ross, 2002; Zell, 2002).  The 
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Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”), which was the agency created by Congress in 
1989 to address the S&L crisis, created a vehicle through which the distressed assets of 
the failing S&Ls were able to be liquidated.  A large part of the S&L clean-up was 
divesting the inventory of real estate properties that had been given back to the S&L 
institutions by borrowers.  The primary reasons for this significant number of real estate 
related defaults were the rising interest rates of the time and the effects of the 1986 tax 
overhaul.  As interest rates rose, any fixed-rate loans, which generally were still being 
carried on the S&L balance sheets, were declining in value.  The higher interest rates also 
meant that purchasers could not afford to pay as much for real estate, which clearly 
affected the real estate prices of the time.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 further 
exacerbated the plight of the S&Ls and property prices by eliminating passive activity tax 
shelters that were a primary driver of the real estate demand and price inflation.  This 
immediately reduced the real estate values by the present value of the foregone tax shelter 
benefits.   
 
The days of 100% financing were over, at least for a while.  Understandably, more 
conservative underwriting required larger amounts of equity, a change new to the average 
real estate participant.  Other investment companies, such as Goldman Sachs, were not 
far behind the Zell-Merrill I Real Estate Fund in recognizing this great opportunity, so 
they began raising equity to take advantage of the situation as well (Linneman and Ross, 
2002).  Thus, the “Real Estate Opportunity Fund” industry was born. 
 
Various categories are often used to classify real estate funds based on their relative risk 
and return expectations (Ernst & Young, 2005).  See Chart 2.1 for a list of the fund 
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categories and the corresponding gross levered total return expectations that define each 
category.   
 
Chart 2.1 – Real Estate Fund Categories 
 
                         * Source: Ernst & Young 
 
These commingled real estate based funds can be open-ended or closed-ended vehicles, 
depending on the nature of their investment strategy and the makeup of their investors.  
Generally, core and core-plus funds are open-ended, while value-added and opportunity 
funds are closed-ended.  The core and core-plus funds focus on more stable assets in 
primary markets, which are much more liquid than the typical value-added or opportunity 
investment.  The types of investors in this space are primarily large institutions looking 
for yield and portfolio diversification.  The relatively liquid nature of the investments and 
the investors’ objectives make the open-ended investment vehicle far more appealing for 
core and core-plus investors.  On the other hand, the characteristics of the value-added 
and opportunity space, namely the illiquid nature of the investments and investor focus 
on total returns, are much more suitable for a closed-ended vehicle.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, the emphasis is on opportunity funds; however, most of the lessons learned 
apply to the value-added vehicles as well.  The strategies utilized by the value-added and 
opportunistic funds are very similar.  In fact, some fund sponsors generally considered to 
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be opportunistic have reduced their return expectations because of the tightening of the 
current real estate market and have slipped into the value-added category.    
 
Today, the high-yield real estate fund industry, which encompasses the value-added and 
opportunistic space, is nearly 20 years old and is growing at a frenetic pace.  Ernst & 
Young (2005) estimated that $18 billion of capital was raised in 2004, bringing the 
assumed cumulative dollar amount of equity capital amassed, since the inception of the 
industry, to approximately $120 billion (see Chart 2.2 and Chart 2.3).2 
 
Chart 2.2 – Total Fund Equity Raised (by year) 
 
 
                                                                                            * Source: Ernst & Young 
 
                                                 
2 Both figures include value-added and opportunistic funds. 
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Chart 2.3 – Cumulative Fund Equity Raised (by year) 
 
 
                                                                        * Source: Ernst & Young 
 
This past year was one for the record books as far as fund raising is concerned.  Actual 
capital raised as of December 2005 was approximately $78 billion3 ($36 billion for 
opportunity funds) (Real Estate Alert, 2006).  In fact, projected equity to be raised for the 
high-yield real estate fund universe for 2005 and 2006 was approximately $116 billion4 
($55 billion for opportunity funds alone) (Real Estate Alert, 2006).  Appendices A 
through C offer a detailed listing of the major funds that were planned to be raised during 
2005 and 2006, including the projected equity size of each respective fund.   
To date, most of these funds have met or exceeded the projections outlined in 
Appendices A through C.  Based on the information from Real Estate Alert (2006), the 
                                                 
3 This includes opportunistic, value-added, and high-yield debt (which can be value-added or 
opportunistic) funds. 
4 Ibid. 
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average projected fund size as measured by equity for the 2005 and 2006 period was 
approximately $517 million while the median and the mode for the data set were $350 
million and $100 million, respectively.  Twenty-nine of the funds were expected to 
achieve, ultimately, capital commitments of at least $1 billion or more (Real Estate Alert, 
2006). 
 
The next chapter outlines how the industry’s roots in the private equity space have had a 
profound effect on the typical legal structure of the average opportunity fund. 
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CHAPTER III: LEGAL STRUCTURE 
The typical legal structure for a real estate opportunity fund is remarkably similar to that 
of its LBO brethren.  Both are generally established as limited life, closed-ended 
investment vehicles.  The actual fund generally is organized as a limited partnership 
(“L.P.”), whereas the general partner in the fund is usually organized as a limited liability 
company (“L.L.C.”) (Presant, 2006).   Fund lives range from eight to ten years, with 
typical investment periods of three to four years followed by a value-adding period and 
then a harvesting period (Presant, 2006).  Most partnership agreements provide for one or 
more extensions of the fund’s life, with certain stipulated approvals required (Presant, 
2006).  In general, the goal of this structure is to minimize legal and financial liability, as 
well as to create an optimally efficient investment vehicle for tax purposes.  Figure 3.1 
below is an example of the typical organizational structure.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Typical Entity Structure for U.S.-based Opportunity Fund 
 
 
Investment Company 
(Sponsor), L.L.C. 
 
Opportunity Fund, L.P.
Taxable Limited 
Partners 
Tax-Exempt Limited 
Partners 
 
Investment I, L.L.C. 
 
Investment II, L.L.C. 
 
Investment III, L.L.C.
 
Project 
 
Project 
 
Project 
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In Figure 3.1, the entity labeled Opportunity Fund (the “Fund”) is the primary 
investment vehicle.  The investment company (sponsor) acts as the general partner 
(“G.P.”) (Linneman and Ross, 2002).  The limited partners, both taxable and tax-exempt 
investors, invest side-by-side with the general partner into the Fund (Linneman and Ross, 
2002).  Several reasons explain why this structure type is warranted.  Limited partners in 
an L.P. are exposed to liability only to the extent of their respective investment in the 
partnership (Loffman and Presant, 2000).5  This arrangement is appealing to many 
sophisticated investors.  However, the general partner’s liability is not limited to his 
respective investment (Loffman and Presant, 2000).  An L.L.C., if structured properly, 
serves to limit the personal liability of its members (Loffman and Presant, 2000).  
Therefore, by making the general partner an L.L.C., the members of the general partner 
can also limit their personal liability.  It is worth noting that the place of domicile is also 
very important when raising a new fund.  Generally, Delaware is the choice location for 
U.S.-based business entities because the historically favorable case law in the state 
permits partnerships’ documentation to be enforced (as written by the G.P. and its 
attorneys) to the maximum extent (Presant, 2006). 
 
The actual real estate investments are held below the Fund in individual L.L.C.s or L.P.s 
to separate each property legally.  This construct serves to prevent one failed investment 
from jeopardizing the Fund’s entire portfolio of assets.  In most states, the L.L.C. has 
become the preferred entity structure in which to hold real estate.  There are some 
exceptions, such as Texas, which still utilizes the L.P. structure to avoid franchise tax 
                                                 
5 The predominant use of a limited partnership for the fund level entity structure is more out of tradition 
than functionality (Presant, 2006).  These were originally the best vehicles to use, and the industry 
participants have been reluctant to change (Presant, 2006). 
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liability (Loffman and Presant, 2000).6  The investment strategies (global vs. domestic, 
non-performing loan portfolios, mezzanine debt, etc.) vary by fund and fund sponsor, and 
the complex structuring required to facilitate such strategies generally resides at tiers 
below the fund and will not be addressed in this thesis. 
 
The L.P. and L.L.C. structures are extremely accommodating to customized financial 
structures.  Chapter IV will discuss the typical opportunity fund financial structure. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The franchise tax was amended during 2006 and will be replaced by the new “margin tax” effective 
January 1, 2007.  The new tax will eliminate the current loophole provided by using an L.P. as the business 
entity (of course certain exceptions still exist)  (Swadley, 2006). 
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CHAPTER IV: FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
Obviously, the top priority for every investor is achieving the net return targeted at the 
time of any investment decision.  Usually, the targeted net return is equal to the gross 
return less the management fee, including any incentive income paid to the fund 
sponsor.7  A prudent investor attempts to achieve his or her agenda by taking great care to 
perform thorough due diligence.  To illustrate, the investor should examine the past 
performance, strategies, and quality of the fund sponsors and negotiate an advantageous 
financial structure.  As stated by Joanne Douvas, “Opportunity fund structures typically 
fall within a range of terms and conditions, with variations resulting from a variety of 
factors, including prior performance/history, size of program, investment strategy, and 
founding limited partners” (2004, p. 26).  Thus, fund sponsors must work to unearth the 
most suitable structure for their fund’s circumstances.  
 
The purpose of the current industry financial structure is to align the interests of the fund 
sponsor with those of the investors for whom the sponsor is investing significant amounts 
of capital.  The financial structure for private equity funds, in general, has always been 
relatively favorable to the G.P.s.  In addition to the income streams associated with being 
an investor in the funds (return of capital, payment of preferred return, and excess profit 
if available), the G.P.s generally receive a significant percentage of the back-end profits, 
which exceeds their capital contribution percentages, as well as a standard annual asset 
management fee based on committed capital during the fund’s investment period and 
unreturned invested capital thereafter (Presant, 2006).  The disproportionate allocation of 
profits, typically 20 percent of total fund profits, is called the G.P.’s “carried interest” or 
                                                 
7 This statement is based on the typical fee structure for opportunity funds. 
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“promote” (Douvas, 2004).  The G.P. carry, a prominent feature of the traditional LBO 
fund financial structure, is meant to compensate the fund sponsor for superior investment 
performance (Douvas, 2004).  Moreover, the fund sponsor as a rule is required to co-
invest in the fund as the general partner.  While the G.P. investment is usually a small 
percentage of the entire fund, the absolute dollar amount is intended to be significant to 
the members of management of the fund sponsor so that the investors feel that their 
interests are aligned with those of management.  Conventional wisdom would tell us that 
it is in the best interest of the fund sponsor’s management, who are now personally 
invested in the fund and have a sizable back-end interest based on performance, to 
maximize the returns of the fund. 
 
Preferred returns to the investors, including general and limited partners, usually range 
from 9 to 11 percent (Douvas, 2004).  The preferred return is the agreed upon hurdle rate 
which, if met, entitles the G.P. to its carried interest.  Once the preferred return is 
achieved, often the G.P. will next enter a catch-up period where it receives a 
disproportionate amount of the distributions until it reaches the agreed-upon percentage 
of the total profits (G.P. carry) (Douvas, 2004).  Some funds have hurdle rates that are 
higher than the preferred return, which trigger the catch-up period.  The catch-up 
percentages during this period generally range from 60 percent / 40 percent (G.P./L.P.) to 
40 percent / 60 percent (G.P./L.P.) (Douvas, 2004).  For example, assuming that a 9% 
preferred return was achieved based on cumulative cash distributions to date and the 
agreed catch-up split was 60 percent / 40 percent (G.P./L.P.), then the G.P. would receive 
60 percent of all cash distributions until it has received its acknowledged percentage of 
the total profits.  If the G.P. carry were 20%, then the final distribution priorities would 
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settle at 20 percent / 80 percent (G.P./L.P.), presuming that cash distributions were 
sufficient to progress completely through each phase of the waterfall structure.  
 
The timing and character of distributions vary by fund sponsor and even by fund (Ernst & 
Young, 2002).  Some funds track contributions, distributions, and tax allocations on an 
investment-by-investment basis, which are called “interim promote” funds (Ernst & 
Young, 2002).  Other funds, termed “fully pooled” funds, track contributions, 
distributions, and tax allocations on a pooled basis (Ernst & Young, 2002).  The ”interim 
promote” method allows for promote distributions to be paid out to the general partner 
after an investment is sold and its capital and preferred return are disbursed to the 
investors for that particular investment (Ernst & Young, 2002).  However, the potential 
problem with this method is that the G.P. may be compensated for superior performance 
on certain investments while other investments in the fund may not be faring as well.  In 
other words, the fund in aggregate may fall short of the marketed preferred return, and 
the limited partners may potentially have overpaid the general partner.  To protect the 
limited partners against over-distribution to the G.P., most funds have some type of claw-
back provision (Douvas, 2004).  For example, some funds stipulate that a certain 
percentage of the general partner carry be escrowed until the fund level preferred return 
and return of capital is achieved on an aggregate basis for all contributed capital, while 
other funds will require some form of collateral to guarantee repayment of potentially 
unearned promote distributions (Ernst & Young, 2002).  With the “fully pooled” method, 
all contributed capital and cumulative preferred returns would have to be paid to the 
investors prior to any payment of G.P. promote (Ernst & Young, 2002).   
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Asset management fees, the other source of income for G.P.s, range from 100 basis 
points to 150 basis points based on the size of the respective capital commitment 
(Douvas, 2004).  Joanne Douvas observes, “Fund management fees are typically 150 
basis points, 125 basis points for commitments of at least $75 million, and 100 basis 
points for commitments over $100 million” (2004, p. 26).  The measure upon which asset 
management fees are calculated often changes to “invested” or “outstanding” capital after 
the investment period terminates.  The terms “invested” and “outstanding” capital are 
very similar and the definition of each can vary slightly from fund to fund, but the driving 
force behind their usage is to develop a standard unit of measure for management fees 
which is fair to investors as the investments are harvested and capital is returned.  Some 
fund sponsors have slightly different fee arrangements, under which they receive 
additional fees for things such as acquisition or disposition services (Douvas, 2004).  
These types of fee arrangements are more typical in open-ended core and core-plus funds. 
 
Now that the legal and financial structures have been introduced it is appropriate to 
discuss the significant tax issues that affect both of these structures. 
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CHAPTER V:  TAX STRUCTURE 
From a tax perspective, there are two major classes of investors for real estate 
opportunity funds.  The first primary class of investor is the taxable one.  Typical taxable 
investors for real estate opportunity funds are high net-worth individuals and any other 
taxable entity that has an appetite for high-risk, high-yield investments.  The second 
major class of investor is the tax-exempt one.  The tax-exempt investor category can be 
further broken down into three primary sub-classes of investors: the qualified pension 
plans (both public and private pension funds), qualified educational institutions 
(university endowment funds), and all other charitable organizations such as public 
charities, charitable remainder trusts, and private foundations.  The differentiation among 
the sub-classes within the tax-exempt investor class is very important, as will become 
quite clear later in this chapter.   
 
Normally, taxable investors are mainly concerned with the avoidance of double taxation.  
However, the general partner and the foreign investor are two investor types particularly 
susceptible to several additional tax issues that can arise during the course of investing in 
real estate opportunity funds.   
 
Two primary topics will be addressed concerning the tax-exempt investor class.  The first 
is Unrelated Business Taxable Income (“UBTI”), which impacts all of the tax-exempt 
sub-classes to some extent.  The second topic to be addressed is the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).  This topic affects only the private pension 
fund investor; however, it is very important because pension funds represent one of the 
largest sources of equity capital for closed-ended commingled real estate funds.  
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TAXABLE INVESTORS 
In addition to providing limited liability to the investors, the structure depicted in Figure 
3.1 in the “Legal Structure” section has noteworthy tax benefits.  If structured correctly, 
both the L.P. and the L.L.C. are flow-through entities for tax purposes (Loffman and 
Presant, 2000).  In other words, the individual partners and members are taxed 
individually on their respective share of income.  This structure eliminates the double 
taxation that would occur under the traditional C Corporation structure in which the 
entity pays taxes at the corporate rate and the shareholders pay a second layer of taxes on 
the dividends (Loffman and Presant, 2000).   
 
A slew of tax issues arise for the typical general partner, given the unique incentive 
structure for the G.P. in the average opportunity fund.  The most notable tax issue for 
general partners bred from the G.P. promote arrangement is phantom income.  Phantom 
income is created for the general partner because income is allocated to reflect the 
promoted or carried interests as profits are realized on early investments, although the 
actual cash is distributed to investors to satisfy their preferences (return of capital, 
preferred return, etc.) (Ernst & Young, 2002).  In other words, income has been assigned 
to the general partner, which triggers a tax liability, whereas the cash received does not 
match the allocated income because the promote payments are deferred.  To address this 
issue, most partnership agreements permit “tax distributions” to be made to the general 
partner for estimated or actual tax liability generated by a phantom income situation 
(Ernst & Young, 2002).  These distributions are almost always offset against future 
general partner promote distributions and are often subject to a separate claw-back or a 
personal guarantee by the members of the general partner (Ernst & Young, 2005).  
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Another general partner tax issue relates to the classification of income received.  As 
mentioned, revenue to the general partner primarily comes in three different forms: an 
annual asset management fee, investment income, and carried interest payments.  The 
asset management fee is usually paid monthly or quarterly by every investor (often with 
exceptions for employees of the fund sponsor who are invested in the fund), which is 
treated as ordinary income by the IRS.  Most fund sponsors rely on the asset management 
fee to cover the overhead associated with operating their respective fund or funds.  
However, an emerging trend is providing the general partner with the option to waive 
future unearned asset management fees in favor of an increased interest in future residual 
profit of the fund, but payable only from appreciation in the value of fund assets that 
occurs after the election is made (Ernst & Young, 2005).  The contingent future residual 
profits, if any, are treated by the IRS as long-term capital gains, which almost always will 
be taxed at a much lower tax rate than will be the ordinary income of the individual 
members of the general partner.  This option to waive is likely not the ideal situation for a 
new fund sponsor which will inevitably need the steady cash flow from an asset 
management fee to operate the new entity.  However, it can be a very effective tax 
planning strategy for well-capitalized sponsors who are willing to put their fees at risk by 
betting on future appreciation to generate capital gain (Presant, 2006).   
 
Like the general partner (investor), the foreign investor must be cognizant of certain tax 
issues that with proper planning are avoidable.  Foreign investors are already taxed on all 
repatriated income by their respective home countries, unless they are tax-exempt in that 
particular domicile; therefore, they would like to minimize any additional taxes to the 
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greatest possible extent.  For example, in the United States the foreign taxable investor is 
extremely sensitive to the ramifications of the Foreign Investment Real Property Tax Act 
(“FIRPTA”) (Ernst & Young, 2003).  FIRPTA essentially mandates a tax on all real 
estate income earned by foreign investors.  A foreign investor can avoid FIRPTA by 
utilizing the same REIT blocker structure that a tax-exempt investor does to avoid UBTI 
(Ernst & Young, 2003).  For further discussion of this blocker structure, see the “Tax-
Exempt Investors” section and Figure 4.2 below. 
 
TAX-EXEMPT INVESTORS  
Unrelated Business Taxable Income 
Unrelated Business Taxable Income is the most significant tax related concern for tax-
exempt investors.  The unrelated business income tax was enacted by Congress in 1950 
in order to prevent any competitive advantages by not-for-profit entities over for-profit 
entities (McDowell, 2000).  Section 512 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code defines 
UBTI as income earned by a tax-exempt entity that is derived from any unrelated trade or 
business.  UBTI requires a tax-exempt entity to file a tax return and pay taxes at the 
corporate rate for the excess of all income meeting the definition of UBTI minus related 
deductions (IRS Publication 598, 2005).  
 
Although interest, dividends, rents from real property, and gains from the sale of real 
property (other than sales of inventory or “dealer” property) are exempt from UBTI, the 
most significant UBTI problem arises from investment income related to “debt-financed 
property” (IRS Publication 598, 2005).  This particular nuance of the IRS code creates a 
substantial problem for a tax-exempt entity seeking to invest in real estate opportunity 
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funds, which generally utilize significant leverage to further enhance returns.  This type 
of UBTI liability is proportional to the amount of debt applied to the acquisition price of 
the respective property or properties (IRS Publication 598, 2005).  For example, if a 
certain investment has been financed with 60% leverage, then 60% of the income 
generated from that property (rents or gain on sale) would be subject to UBTI tax liability 
(IRS Publication 598, 2005).   
 
Fortunately, the real estate lobby was strong enough to negotiate an exception to UBTI 
generated as a result of debt-financed properties, but only for “qualified organizations,” 
namely pension funds and qualified educational institutions (McDowell, 2000).  Section 
514 (c) (9) of the Internal Revenue Code sets forth this exception.  Under this exception, 
any income generated from debt-financed property is not included in the UBTI 
calculation, if the “qualified organizations” satisfactorily clear various hurdles.  The 
Disproportionate Allocation Rule, commonly known as the “Fractions Rule,” is the main 
obstacle that applies for investments made by a partnership (as is commonly the case with 
real estate investments in which a developer enters into a partnership with an opportunity 
fund having tax-exempt investors) (IRS Publication 598, 2005 and Sandy Presant, 2006).  
The “Fractions Rule” presents a significant difficulty for a “qualified organization”.  
Under this rule, no exempt organization’s overall partnership income allocation may be 
less than its share of overall partnership losses in any present or future year for the 
express purpose of preventing the transfer of tax benefits from tax-exempt investors to 
taxable investors (McDowell, 2000).  Compliance monitoring of the “Fractions Rule” has 
become quite cumbersome, given the extensive portion of the investor community that 
must be in compliance with the rule.    
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Certain tax-exempt investors such as charitable remainder trusts can lose their tax-exempt 
status for all income (both UBTI and non-UBTI) if any of their investments generate 
even $1 of unrelated business income tax (Newman, 2004).  As a result, certain creative 
blocker structures, such as the private REIT blocker structure, over the years have 
emerged.  Figure 4.1, below, illustrates the most common REIT blocker structure, where 
the REIT is positioned under the Fund and holds most of the investments.  As noted 
earlier, unrelated business taxable income does not include interest, dividends, royalties, 
rents from real property, or gains from the disposition of property (IRS Publication 598, 
2005).  The REIT structure enables the income to be distributed to the Fund (and then to 
the investors) as dividend income, which is not considered UBTI (Ernst & Young, 2003).  
Not all investments can be made through the REIT because of a “prohibited transaction” 
tax of 100% on dealer property gains to the REIT (Presant, 2006).  Sometimes a taxable 
REIT subsidiary corporation is used to shelter these profits, at the cost of a corporate tax 
(Presant, 2006). 
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Figure 4.1 – Subsidiary REIT Blocker Structure 
 
 
 
Another common, but less frequently used, REIT blocker structure is illustrated in Figure 
4.2.   
 
Figure 4.2 – Investor REIT Blocker Structure 
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In this structure, the tax-exempt or foreign investor contributes capital to the REIT, which 
is a limited partner in the Fund (as opposed to being a subsidiary of the Fund) (Ernst & 
Young, 2003).  However, the problem with this structure is the REIT requirement stating 
that five or fewer individual investors cannot own more than 50% of the REIT stock 
(Ernst & Young, 2003).  In the first REIT blocker structure depicted in Figure 4.1, the 
REIT is positioned below the Fund, which has the advantage of additional investors 
(taxable investors) to dilute the ownership percentages of the REIT so that this provision 
becomes a non-issue. 8  Furthermore, in the Figure 4.2 structure, any dealer property (e.g. 
condominiums) would not be possible because there is no alternative path to avoid 
having it received and recognized by the REIT (unless a taxable REIT subsidiary 
[“TRS”] is used in which case all income will be subject to a corporate level tax) 
(Presant, 2006). 
  
Not only is it important to design the fund correctly to minimize or avoid UBTI, but it is 
also imperative that the fund sponsor have review procedures in place for all acquisitions.  
Often UBTI can be minimized if not completely avoided at the investment level with the 
proper structuring (Ernst & Young, 2003).  Some sponsors will even go so far as to 
reimburse the tax-exempt investor for any UBTI liability generated, but this is rare (Ernst 
& Young, 2003).  Regardless, a well drafted partnership agreement is essential in order to 
identify clearly the G.P.’s responsibility regarding the treatment of UBTI.  With 
charitable trusts and private foundations, the G.P. customarily is expected to avoid all 
UBTI, which necessitates the use of one of the aforesaid UBTI blocker structures (Ernst 
                                                 
8 In both scenarios, there would be additional investors at the level above the REIT entity in order to meet 
the 100 investor minimum requirement for REITS, but they are often individual employees of the general 
partner who make small investments. 
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& Young, 2003).  Other tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds and educational 
institutions, may only hold the G.P. to a “reasonable efforts” standard when attempting to 
avoid or minimize UBTI (Ernst & Young, 2003).  Oftentimes, a minimal amount of 
UBTI is allowed by this second group of investors as certain incidental business revenue 
is unavoidable in the ordinary course of investing in real property (Ernst & Young, 2003).   
 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (the “Act” or ERISA) of 1974 is 
another pressing concern for all general partners9 and certain tax-exempt investors, 
namely private pension funds.  While the concern is not directly tax motivated (aside 
from affecting some tax-exempt investors), certain portions of the act are regulated by the 
IRS; therefore, I address this topic in the “Tax Structure” section.   
 
The Act is a federal law that was enacted to protect the retirement income of employees 
who participate in qualified pension plans in the private sector (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2006).  However, the Act does not apply to qualified pension plans in the public 
sector.  These plans generally are governed by state and local laws (Chicago Board 
Options Exchange, 2001).  The Act sets minimum standards for the administrators of the 
private pension plans to follow, such as providing timely audited financial statements and 
disclosing other pertinent information to the plan’s participants (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2006).  Additionally, the Act establishes accountability for plan fiduciaries (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2006).   
 
                                                 
9 ERISA is a consideration for any general partners who have or plan on having private pension fund 
investors in their fund. 
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ERISA generally defines a fiduciary as anyone who exercises discretionary authority or 
control over a plan's management or assets, including anyone who provides investment 
advice to the plan (U.S. Department of Labor, 2006).  Fiduciaries that do not follow the 
principles of conduct may be held responsible for restoring losses to the plan (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2006).  This point is very important as it relates to real estate 
opportunity funds because the fund sponsors do not want to become liable (under 
ERISA) as fiduciaries.  The general partner of a fund will be a fiduciary of the investing 
plan if the fund is deemed to hold “plan assets” (U.S. Department of Labor, 2006).  In 
order to avoid this designation, a fund sponsor must qualify for one of the exemptions 
under the Act (Ernst & Young, 2003).   
 
Two exemptions are granted by ERISA for which an investment manager may become 
eligible.  The first exemption is the “25% Rule,” which states that qualified pension plans 
must hold less than 25% of the respective fund investment pool (Cashman, 2003).  If a 
sponsor cannot qualify under this rule because 25% or more of the fund’s total 
investment capital was provided by qualified private pension plans, then the fund must 
qualify as a venture capital operating company (“VCOC”) (Cashman, 2003).  To qualify 
as an operating company (VCOC) as defined in section 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-101(c), an 
entity must be primarily engaged, directly or through a majority owned subsidiary or 
subsidiaries, in the production or sale of a product or service other than the investment of 
capital.  Moreover, as outlined in section 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-101(d)(1), a fund will qualify 
as a “real estate operating company” (“REOC”) and therefore as a VCOC if at least 50% 
of its capital is invested through entities whose holdings meet the strict requirements to 
qualify as actively managed real estate constituting “good” VCOC investments.  This test 
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must be met immediately upon the placement of the long-term investment by the plan 
into the fund in order for the fund to maintain its status as a VCOC (Presant, 2006).  
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CHAPTER VI:  SURVEY & INTERVIEW RESULTS 
SURVEY RESULTS 
I drafted and circulated a twenty-question descriptive survey to twenty-one fund 
sponsors.  The purpose of this survey was to uncover any potential, existing best practices 
currently used by fund sponsors and to provide an industry update on the present legal, 
tax, and financial structuring utilized for the funds most recently launched.  I received 
responses from approximately 57% of the fund sponsors who were sent surveys.  
Additionally, of the surveys returned, some respondents elected not to answer every 
question. 
 
The average-sized fund currently being raised by the twenty-one fund sponsors surveyed 
was approximately $1.4 billion.  The median and the mode of the sample set of twenty-
one funds were $1 billion and $1.7 billion, respectively.  Eleven of the funds had capital 
commitments of at least $1 billion or more.  The overwhelming majority of capital raised 
in these funds was received from tax-exempt investors, primarily pension funds (both 
public and private) and university endowment funds.   
 
Of the funds responding to the survey, the average fund life was 8 years, typically with 
two one-year extensions that were subject to some type of approval.  The kind of 
approvals necessary to extend the fund life ranged from advisory committee approval to 
investor approval, with variations that generally consisted of some combination of the 
two methods.  Some of the funds had extensions that could be executed at the G.P.’s 
discretion.  The average fund investment period was three years; however, the starting 
point of the investment period varied from the first capital close to the final capital close.  
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The investment periods have remained consistent with those of the respective predecessor 
funds in cases where the respondents had predecessor funds.  Some funds allowed for 
extensions of the investment period in order to give the fund sponsors adequate time to 
place the committed capital in the current market environment.   
 
Survey Results  - Legal Structuring  
The legal structuring seems to be the most standardized of the three structuring 
disciplines.  All of the funds were organized as L.P.s, and a majority of the general 
partners were organized as L.L.C.s (or L.P.s which led to an L.L.C. at a higher tier).  
Generally, the entities were organized in the state of Delaware.  This is consistent with 
historic industry standards.   
 
Survey Results  - Financial Structuring  
 
A majority of the funds distribute the general partner carry on some variation of the 
“interim promote” method, as opposed to the “fully pooled” method.  Although, 
interestingly enough most of the new fund sponsors utilized the “fully pooled method” – 
this is the new trend in the industry (Presant, 2006).  In either case, the distribution 
priorities are usually return of capital, preferred return, and then profits, and in some 
cases the aggregate management fee is returned to investors with interest after the return 
of capital and the preferred return, but prior to the general partner carry.   
 
As of the second half of 2006, preferred returns ranged from 8% to 11%, with an average 
of 9%.  One respondent had two separate preferred return rates based on a certain 
monetary threshold for each investor.  All investors with capital commitments above this 
threshold received a 200 basis point premium.  Preferred return rates have compressed 
                                                                           35
slightly (approximately 100 basis points from the range given by Douvas in her 2004 
Wharton Real Estate Review article), with 11% being the outlier in my sample set.  There 
was no particular trend noted relevant to the size of the fund or the seniority of the fund 
within the fund sponsors’ respective fund complex.  However, one of the more prominent 
fund sponsors was able to command a lower preferred return with no significant 
pushback from its limited partners.    
 
The general partner carry ranged from 17.5% to 30%, with one fund even having a 
second hurdle that, if met, resulted in a 40% carried interest.  The standard G.P. carry was 
20% of total profits, with the outliers on the high side coming at the expense of slower 
catch-up percentages and higher hurdle rates.  The smaller and relatively newer fund 
sponsors seemed to have less bargaining power over the final general partner carried 
interest.  The catch-up percentages were all over the board, ranging from 80 percent / 20 
percent (G.P./L.P.) to 20 percent / 80 percent (G.P./L.P.), with 60 percent / 40 percent 
being the most common catch-up split between the G.P. and L.P.  A few of the 
respondents had multi-tiered catch-up schemes, based on a secondary hurdle rate.  This 
scheme is meant to slowdown the G.P. catch-up.  An overwhelming majority of the fund 
sponsors surveyed agreed that the most heavily negotiated terms in the latest round of 
fund raising were the preferred rate of return and the catch-up provisions.  
 
The annual asset management fee among those who replied ranged from 50 basis points 
to 150 basis points, all initially calculated on committed capital.  More often than not, the 
asset management fee calculation metric would change from committed capital to 
“invested” or “outstanding” capital after the investment period termination date.  Some 
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fund sponsors not only changed the unit of measure after the investment period 
terminated, but also reduced the fee.  The most common fee structure was a static price 
point for all investors.  There were a few tiered management fee schemes.  In one method 
the investors received a discount for larger capital commitments at different tiers.  
Another method applied a discount to the dollar amount over the established thresholds.  
For example, 150 basis points would be charged for the first $50 million of an 
investment, then 125 basis points for the next $50 million, and so on.  Very few of the 
survey participants charged additional fees for acquisition or disposition services.  In 
cases where such extra fees were charged, the asset management fee was generally below 
the industry standard benchmark of 150 basis points.  Additionally, most of the 
respondents indicated that they were entitled to reimbursement for direct fund expenses 
and initial organizational costs up to a certain agreed upon threshold.  The organizational 
cost reimbursement often excluded investment banking placement fees and in no case 
exceeded $1.5 million. 
 
Survey Results  - Tax Structuring 
 
The fund sponsors who answered the survey were split on whether their respective 
partnership agreements provided for tax distributions to the G.P. for phantom income.  
For those whose partnership agreements provided for tax distributions, determinations 
generally were made on a year-by-year basis based on assumed tax liability, and the 
distributions were optional to the G.P.  More often than not, these tax distributions were 
collateralized by the G.P.’s carried interest, the G.P.’s capital balance, or personal 
guarantees by members of the G.P., or a combination thereof. 
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All sponsors whose funds included qualified, private pension plans utilized one of the 
ERISA exemptions previously described in the “Tax Structuring” section.  The funds 
whose ERISA investors contributed more than 25% of the funds’ investment capital 
mentioned that they spent a significant amount of time trying to avoid plan asset 
treatment by investing through “good” REOC and VCOC vehicles. 
 
None of the survey respondents were required to eliminate UBTI entirely, but several of 
them did rely on REIT or corporate blockers at the fund level to avoid UBTI or FIRPTA.  
Generally, private REIT structures were set up to benefit large tax-exempt or foreign 
investors.  The respondents indicated that the further expense and operational complexity 
associated with creating and monitoring these more complex ownership structures were 
well worth the effort because of the benefits of appealing to a much broader investor 
base.  Many of the fund sponsors responded that they would seek to avoid transactions 
that had significant UBTI implications if they could not structure around the UBTI at the 
investment level.  
 
INTERVIEW RESULTS 
Interviews were conducted with representatives from two large pension funds and two 
prominent university endowment funds.  The interviews were performed to help discern 
the most significant concerns of the major opportunity fund investors.   
 
According to the investors interviewed, the average allocation target for real estate assets 
to total (pension fund or endowment fund) assets was 10%.  Most of these investors were 
in the process of attempting to increase their current allocations to achieve this target.  
This group of investors currently manages approximately $105 billion of total assets.  
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Most of them are actively invested with anywhere from 10 to 25 separate high-yield real 
estate fund complexes.   
 
The single most important factor for the investors interviewed was forging relationships 
with great management teams that exemplified a best-in-class business approach 
(including proactively and reasonably addressing specific investor needs with regards to 
fund structuring) and a sound investment strategy.  More often than not, the investors 
were satisfied with the current incentive structures provided that the fund sponsors were 
delivering the promised returns.  The preferred return rates, catch-up provisions, and 
claw-back provisions were all mentioned as areas of great consequence.  If effectively 
utilized, these tools can serve to balance the incentive structure properly.  It was also 
noted that the tax language is generally an area of heavy negotiation. 
 
Several concerns that may not receive as much attention are “key man” provisions and 
general partners’ abuse of the fund level credit facility.  Understandably, investors who 
make significant investments in funds based on the talent of the management of the fund 
sponsor will be concerned if the management team breaks up.  Including a “key man” 
provision that allows for termination of the investment period and that stipulates the 
manner in which the fund will be managed on an ongoing basis is the only realistic 
alternative.  Nonetheless, departure of key managers constitutes an added risk associated 
with investing in highly specialized private investment vehicles.  The question of the 
misapplication of the fund credit facility to effectively lower preferred return rates 
surfaces when the general partners employ the facility to defer making capital calls.  By 
delaying the capital calls and instead replacing them with lower-rate “subscription line” 
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borrowings (secured by the investors’ subscription commitments for capital), the internal 
rate-of-return clock for investors does not begin ticking, thereby diminishing returns to 
investors and increasing the amount of profits available for back-end G.P. carry.  One of 
the endowment fund representatives believes that this issue will self-correct as interest 
rates continue to rise, and does not believe that this will be a major concern in the future. 
 
Surely, the importance for fund sponsors to invest the time and money necessary to 
appropriately and optimally structure their fund for legal, financial, and tax purposes, is 
abundantly clear.    
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CHAPTER VII:  CONCLUSION 
The mission of this thesis was to uncover the most important structuring issues facing 
real estate opportunity fund sponsors when they are raising a new fund and to identify the 
current industry practices while doing so.  I have provided a broad snapshot of the history 
and origin of the current real estate opportunity fund industry.  I have also reviewed the 
industry standard legal, financial, and tax structures for these funds.  Moreover, by 
utilizing the results of a comprehensive industry survey and interview process, I have 
presented an update of the current industry practices.  While no specific new best 
practices were able to be communicated, the results were very instructive and served as a 
reminder that this is a dynamic and ever changing industry.  
 
As suspected, the legal structures fell within the already established standards, with some 
obvious tax-motivated deviations relating to issues such as UBTI and FIRPTA.  In fact, 
private REIT and taxable corporate blockers are becoming commonplace for funds with a 
heavy tax-exempt or foreign investor base.  Conversely, the financial structure is as 
varied as the different strategies in today’s industry.  Themes like a 20% carried interest 
with a 60% / 40% (G.P./L.P.) catch-up and a 9% preferred rate of return are immediately 
visible, but the ranges for the various terms are all over the place.  Investors seem willing 
to be flexible with these terms on a deal by deal basis.  Understandably, the larger and 
often more experienced firms appear to have more leverage while negotiating with 
investors.  The firms that have been able to establish a reputable track record and can 
utilize the “franchise” which they have built are being bombarded by interested investors.  
Some of these franchise fund sponsors are even in some cases turning away investors.  
This has had the effect of allowing a number of funds to keep certain G.P. favorable fund 
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terms, such as the “interim promote” method of distributing the G.P. carried interest and 
aggressive catch-up percentages.  In fact, some fund sponsors had success in lowering the 
limited partner preferred return rates.  Newer fund sponsors, on the other hand, are more 
likely to settle for more investor-friendly terms in hopes of building their own long-term 
franchise.   
 
While there are general guidelines for the overall structure of an opportunity fund, there 
can truly be no universal paradigm for best practice, given that everything depends on the 
strategy and investor makeup of each specific fund.  Knowing one’s investor mix and 
each one’s array of complex needs and concerns can be of significant benefit to new fund 
sponsors.  It is essential for fund sponsors to analyze carefully their target investor type, 
as the composition of their investor base can have far reaching effects on the configuring 
of their funds.  This thesis has only begun to scratch the surface of the extensive and 
complex structuring issues that challenge sponsors of real estate opportunity funds today.  
Hopefully, the readers have gained some insight into the current industry trends and have 
been inspired to consult their legal and tax professionals early and often.   
 
The scale of the opportunity fund industry and the magnitude of its growth are manifest.  
The industry is hot, which can simultaneously be a blessing and a curse.  In the current 
market, raising capital is no longer the issue.  Rather, the issue has now become placing 
the capital in this hyper-competitive real estate market.  Although it appears that there has 
been a fundamental shift of institutional capital into the real estate market that is likely 
there to stay, the capital market will cycle and some capital will inevitably depart in 
search of better returns.  When this happens, the investors will be better positioned to 
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negotiate terms.  Under any market conditions, however, funds will continue to benefit by 
finding new ways to differentiate themselves from the field.  After all, individuality is 
crucial to the future survival and ultimate viability of every fund sponsor.   
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SPONSOR FUND Proj. Equity 
Size ($Mil.) 
Aetos Capital Aetos Capital Asia Fund 2 2,200 
AEW Capital 
Management 
AEW Partners 5 650 
Angelo Gordon & Co. AG Asia Realty Fund 300 
Angelo Gordon & Co. AG Realty Fund 6 550 
Apollo Real Estate 
Advisors 
Apollo Real Estate Fund 5 650 
Athena Group Athena Real Estate Partners 2 100 
Barrow Street Capital Barrow Street Real Estate Fund 3 350 
Behringer Harvard 
Funds 
Behringer Harvard Strategic 
Opportunity Fund 2 
50+ 
Black Creek Group Mexico Retail Partners 250 
Blackstone Group Blackstone Real Estate Partners 5 4,000 
Boulder Net Lease 
Funds 
Boulder Net Lease Fund 1 100 
Brookfield Asset 
Management 
Brookfield Real Estate 
Opportunity Fund 
1,000 
Bryanston Realty 
Partners 
Bryanston Retail Opportunity 
Fund 
150 
Canyon Capital Realty 
Advisors 
Canyon Johnson Urban Fund 2 600 
Carlyle Group Carlyle Asia Real Estate Partners 410 
Carlyle Group Carlyle Europe Real Estate 
Partners 2 
930 
Carlyle Group Carlyle Realty Partners 4 950 
CB Richard Ellis 
Investors 
Global Net Lease Partners 100 
Cherokee Investment 
Partners 
Cherokee Investment Partners 4 1,200 
Cheslock Bakker & 
Associates 
CBA Opportunity Fund 2 500+ 
Colony Capital  Colony Asia 2 500 
Colony Capital  Colony Europe 2 600 
Colony Capital  Colony Investors 8 2,000 
Concorde Investors Colliers-Concorde Ukraine Real 
Estate Fund 
100 
Contrarian Capital 
Management 
Contrarian Real Estate Fund 250 
Credit Suisse  DLJ Real Estate Capital Partners 3 1,100 
Dolphin Capital 
Partners 
Dolphin Capital Investors 125 
Dornoch Holdings Dornoch Opportunity Fund 2 50 
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SPONSOR FUND Proj. Equity 
Size ($Mil.) 
Doughty Hanson & Co. Doughty Hanson & Co. European 
Real Estate 2 
500 
Dunmore Capital Dunmore Capital Fund 100 
E2M Partners E2M Value Added Fund 308 
eRealty Fund US Value Fund 1 150 
Europa Capital 
Management 
Europa Fund 2 536 
GI Partners GE Partners 2 1,000 
Goldman Sachs Whitehall Street Global Real 
Estate 2005 
1,700 
Goldman Sachs Whitehall Street International Real 
Estate 2005 
1,600 
Grove International 
Partners 
Cypress Grove International 1,200 
Guardian Realty Guardian Realty Fund 2 100 
Halcyon Ventures Halcyon Real Estate Partners 152 
Harbert Management Harbert European Real Estate 
Fund 2 
250-300 
Highcross Group Highcross Regional UK Partners 2 570 
Hutensky Group HRI Fund 100 
ICICI Venture ICICI India Advantage Fund 3-4 300 
IL&FS Investment 
Managers 
IL&FS India Realty Fund 300 
ING Clarion Partners ING Clarion Development 
Ventures 2 
205 
ING Real Estate ING Real Estate China 
Opportunity Fund 
100 
InvestLinc Group InvestLinc GK Properties Fund 2 50 
InvestLinc Group InvestLinc Real Estate Capital 3 
Fund 
150 
JER Partners JER Real Estate Partners 3 823 
JER Partners, Alfa 
Capital Partners 
Marbleton Property Fund 150-200 
Kimpton Hotel & 
Restaurant Group 
Kimpton Hospitality Partners 157 
LaSalle Investment 
Management 
LaSalle Asia Opportunity Fund 2 1,000 
Lazard Real Estate 
Partners 
Lazard Senior Housing Partners 250 
Legg Mason Real 
Estate Services 
Legg Mason Residential 
Investment Partners 1 
200 
Lehman Brothers Lehman Brothers Real Estate , 
Partners 2 
2,400 
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SPONSOR FUND Proj. Equity 
Size ($Mil.) 
Lexin Capital Lexin Amtrust Real Estate 
Partners 
72 
Lexin Capital Lexin Amtrust Real Estate 
Partners 2 
150 
Lubert-Adler Partners Lubert-Adler Fund 5 1,700 
Macquarie Global 
Property 
Macquarie Global Property Fund 2 1290 
McAlister Co. JM Texas Land , Fund 4 56 
McAlister Co. JM Texas Land , Fund 5 100 
Moorfield Group Moorfield Real Estate Fund 460 
NewSec Group Nordic Investment Fund 3 391 
NorthStar Capital NorthStar Capital Investment Fund 200 
O'Connor Capital 
Partners 
O'Connor North American 
Property Partners 2 
500 
Och-Ziff Capital 
Management 
Och-Ziff Real Estate Fund 410 
Onex Corp. Onex Real Estate Partners 500 
Orion Capital 
Managers 
Orion European Fund 2 608 
Paladin Realty Partners Paladin Realty Latin America 
Investors 2 
200 
Phoenix Realty Group San Diego Smart Growth Fund 90 
Praedium Group Praedium Fund 6 700 
Prudential Real Estate 
Investor 
Mexico Retail Investment Program 250 
Prudential Real Estate 
Investor 
PLA Residential Fund 3 400 
Robert Sheridan & 
Partners 
Fund 1 50 
Rockpoint Group Rockpoint Real Estate Fund 2 1,700 
RREEF RREEF Global Opportunities 
Fund 2 
1,500 
Secured Capital Secured Capital Japan Real Estate 
Partners 2 
176 
Soundview Real Estate 
Partners 
Soundview , Partners 2 75-100 
Spear Street Capital  Spear Street , Capital 2 325 
Starwood Capital 
Group 
Starwood Capital Hospitality Fund 
1 
900 
Starwood Capital 
Group 
Starwood Global Opportunity 
Fund 7 
1,475 
Tano Capital (Not yet named) 300-500 
Thayer Hotel Lodging Thayer Hotel Investors 4 233 
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SPONSOR FUND Proj. Equity 
Size ($Mil.) 
Thor Equities Thor Urban Operating Fund 375 
Tishman Speyer Tishman Speyer India Fund 350-400 
Tishman Speyer, , GSC 
Partners 
Tishman Speyer GSC China Fund 500 
Tuckerman Group Residential Income and Value 
Added Fund 
165 
Walton Street Capital Walton Street Real Estate Fund 5 1,700 
Welbilt Realty Partners China-New York Real Estate 
Opportunity Fund 1 
500 
West University 
Capital 
(Not yet named) 400 
Westbrook Partners Westbrook Real Estate Fund 6 600 
Westbrook Partners Westbrook Real Estate Fund 7 1,000 
      
           * Source: Real Estate Alert 
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SPONSOR FUND Proj. Equity 
Size ($Mil.) 
Acadia Realty Trust Acadia Strategic Opportunity 2 300 
AMB Property AMB Japan Fund 1 526 
AmStar Group AmStar Group Value-Added Fund 350 
Apollo Real Estate 
Advisors 
Apollo European Real Estate 
Fund 2 
600 
AvalonBay 
Communities 
AvalonBay Value-Added Fund 330 
Avanti Investment 
Advisors 
Avanti Strategic Land Investors 4 224 
Avanti Investment 
Advisors 
Avanti Strategic Land Investors 5 200-250 
BayNorth Capital BayNorth Realty Fund 6 430 
Beacon Capital Partners Beacon Capital Strategic Partners 
4 
2,025 
Behringer Harvard Behringer Harvard Opportunity 
REIT 1 
400 
Bernstein Cos. Consortium , Capital 4 100 
BPG Properties BPG Investment Partnership 7/7A 550 
Broadreach Capital 
Partners 
BRCP Realty 2 600-700 
Broadway Real Estate 
Partners 
Broadway Partners Real Estate 
Fund 2 
400 
Brookdale Group Brookdale , Investors 5 460 
Buchanan Street 
Partners 
Buchanan Fund 5 350 
Cargill Value 
Investment 
North American Real Estate 
Partners 2 
750 
Carmel Partners Carmel Partners Investment Fund 
2 
400 
CB Richard Ellis 
Investors 
CB Richard Ellis Strategic 
Partners UK Fund 2 
400 
CB Richard Ellis 
Investors 
CB Richard Ellis Strategic 
Partners UK Fund 3 
600 
Chadwick Saylor Los Angeles Development 
Partners 
250 
CIM Group CIM Urban Real Estate Fund 3 1,250-1,500 
Commonwealth Realty 
Advisors 
Workers Realty Trust 2 125 
Concert Realty Partners Concert , Multi-Family 3 300 
Cornerstone Real Estate 
Advisors 
Cornerstone Hotel Income & 
Equity Fund 
300 
Coventry Real Estate Coventry Real Estate Fund 2 333 
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SPONSOR FUND Proj. Equity 
Size ($Mil.) 
Crescent Real Estate 
Equities 
Crescent Real Estate Investments 
1 
250 
CrossHarbor Capital 
Partners 
CrossHarbor Institutional Partners 400 
CT Realty CT California Fund 5 54 
DRA Advisors  DRA Growth & Income Fund 5 1,000 
Embarcadero Capital 
Partners 
Embarcadero Capital Investors 2 210 
Equastone Equastone Value Fund 2 75 
Equity International EI Fund 2 308 
Essex Property Trust Essex Apartment Value Fund 2 266 
Fidelity Management Fidelity Real Estate Growth Fund 
2 
625 
Fidelity Management Fidelity Real Estate Growth Fund 
3 
750 
First Point Partners First Point Partners Equity Fund 300 
Fortress Investment Fortress Residential Investment 
Deutschland 
2,000 
Forum Partners 
Investment 
Management 
Forum Asian Realty Income 2 250 
Fremont Realty Capital Fremont Strategic Property 
Partners 2 
500 
GMAC Institutional 
Advisors 
GMAC Commercial Realty 
Partners 2 
625 
Green Courte Partners Green Courte Real Estate Partners 120 
Hampshire Cos. Hampshire Partners Fund 6 235 
Harbert Management Harbert Real Estate Fund 3 300 
HEI Hospitality HEI Hospitality , Fund 2 425 
Heitman Heitman European Property 
Partners 3 
410 
Heitman Heitman Value Partners 400 
Intercontinental Real 
Estate Corp. 
Intercontinental Real Estate 
Investment Fund 4 
200 
Invesco Real Estate Invesco Real Estate Fund 1 320 
JER Partners JER Real Estate Partners Europe 3 360 
J.P. Morgan Investment 
Management 
Excelsior 2 450 
John Buck Co. JBC Opportunity Fund 3 350 
Kotak Mahindra 
Investments 
Kotak India Real Estate Fund 1 160 
KTR Capital Partners Keystone Industrial Fund 500 
Laramar Group Laramar Multifamily Value Fund 250 
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SPONSOR FUND Proj. Equity 
Size ($Mil.) 
LaSalle Investment, 
Management 
LaSalle French , Fund 2 406 
LaSalle Investment, 
Management 
LaSalle Income and Growth Fund 
4 
500 
LBA Realty LBA Realty Fund 2 400 
Legacy Partners Legacy Partners Realty Fund 2 325 
Legg Mason Real Estate 
Investors 
Chesapeake Real Estate Value 
Investors 
150 
Lowe Enterprises Lowe Hospitality Investment 
Partners 
266 
Lowe Enterprises Lowe Hospitality Investment , 
Partners 2 
300 
Macfarlan Capital 
Partners 
Macfarlan Income-Opportunity 
Funds 
85 
Madison Marquette Madison Marquette Retail 
Enhancement Fund 
350 
Menlo Equities Menlo Realty Partners 2 50 
Miller Global Properties Miller Global Fund 5 290 
Morgan Stanley Real 
Estate 
Morgan Stanley Real Estate Fund 
5 International 
4,200 
New Boston Real Estate 
Investment Funds 
Urban Strategy America Fund 200 
Normandy Real Estate 
Partners 
Normandy Real Estate Fund 450 
Northland Investment Northland Fund 2 100 
Pacific Coast Capital 
Partners 
California Smart Growth Fund 4 450 
Palisades Financial Palisades Regional Investment 
Fund 2 
200 
Parmenter Fund 
Management 
Parmenter Realty Fund 3 250 
Penwood Real Estate 
Investment 
Management 
California Select Industrial Fund 100 
Perseus Realty Partners Perseus Capital City Fund 100 
Phillips , Edison & Co. Phillips Edison Shopping Center 
Fund 3 
275 
Place Properties, , Blue 
Vista Capital Mgmt. 
Place/Blue Vista Student Housing 
Fund 
200 
Rexford Industrial Rexford Industrial Fund 3 61 
RiverOak Investment 
Corp. 
RiverOak Realty Fund 4 50 
RLJ Development RLJ Lodging Fund 2 600 
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SPONSOR FUND Proj. Equity 
Size ($Mil.) 
Rockwood Capital  Rockwood Capital Real Estate , 
Partners Fund 6 
657 
Rockwood Capital  Rockwood Capital Real Estate , 
Partners Fund 7 
850 
Rothschild Realty Five Arrows Realty Securities 4 445 
Sarofim Realty 
Advisors 
Sarofim Multifamily Fund 70 
ScanlanKemper-Bard SKB Real Estate Investors 125 
Sentinel Real Estate Sentinel Multifamily Value-
Added Fund 1 
500 
Somera Capital 
Management 
Somera Realty Value Fund 132 
Somera Capital 
Management 
Somera Realty Value Fund 2 250 
Somerset Partners Somerset Multifamily 1 100 
Sterling Equities Sterling American Property Fund 
5 
550 
Stockbridge Real Estate 
Partners 
Stockbridge Real Estate Fund 2 1,000 
Stoltz Real Estate 
Partners 
Stoltz Real Estate Fund 2 100 
TA Associates Realty Realty Associates Fund 7 832 
Tishman Speyer Tishman Speyer European Real 
Estate Venture 6 
600 
Tishman Speyer Tishman Speyer Real Estate 
Venture 6 
1,100 
Transwestern 
Investment  
Aslan Realty Partners 3 800 
Triton Pacific 
Investment 
Management 
Strategic Partners Value-
Enhancement Fund 
200-250 
Tuckerman Group Redevelopment and Renovation 
Fund 
125 
UrbanAmerica UrbanAmerica 2 300 
Urdang & Associates Urdang Value-Added Fund 2 500+ 
VEF Advisors Value Enhancement Fund 6 450 
Waterton Associates Waterton Residential Fund 9 330 
Williams Realty 
Advisors 
Williams Realty , Fund 2 400 
  
   * Source: Real Estate Alert 
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SPONSOR FUND Proj. Equity 
Size ($Mil.) 
Apollo Real Estate Advisors Apollo Real Estate Finance Corp. 400 
ARCap ARCap High Yield CMBS Fund 2 236 
ARCap ARCap Diversified Risk CMBS 
Fund 2 
268 
BlackRock  Carbon Capital 2 380 
Brascan Real Estate Financial 
Partners 
BREF One 600 
Canyon Capital Realty 
Advisors 
Canyon Value Mortgage Fund 500 
Canyon Capital Realty 
Advisors 
Canyon Value Mortgage Fund 2 500 
Capri Capital Advisors Capri Select , Income 2 303 
Fillmore Capital Partners Fillmore East Fund 500 
Five Mile Capital Partners Five Mile Capital Structured Income 
Fund 
662 
Guggenheim Partners Guggenheim Structured Real Estate 2 750 
Hudson Realty Capital Hudson Realty Capital Fund 3 90 
Independence Capital Partners LEM Mezzanine Fund 2 250 
Island Capital IOP 3 150 
Legg Mason Real Estate 
Investors 
Legg Mason Real Estate Capital 2 436 
Lehman Brothers Lehman Brothers Real Estate 
Mezzanine Partners 
1,065 
LNR Property Holdings LNR Europe Investors 630 
Lone Star Funds Lone Star Fund 5 5,000 
Mesa West Capital Mesa West Real Estate Income Fund 200 
MKA Capital Group Advisors MKA Real Estate Opportunity Fund 200 
MMA Realty Capital MMA B-Note Value Fund 235 
MMA Realty Capital MMA/Transwestern Mezzanine 
Realty Partners 2 
300 
NY Credit Advisors NY Credit Real Estate Fund 350 
RCG Longview Partners RCG Longview 3 300-500 
Rockbridge Capital Rockbridge Real Estate Fund 3 150 
RREEF RREEF Structured Debt Fund 400 
Shamrock Holdings Genesis Real Estate Fund 2 104 
Tricon Capital Group Tricon Capital Fund 6/7 330 
True North Management True North Mezzanine Investment 
Fund 
110 
